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GottiFBI's Espionage Keepsakes: Up but not completed yet. Please be patient. Check it out. Thanks. |
Welcome to the Espionage Page. Here you will find links to various subjects related to espionage.
You'll find some history as well as the most notorious names in the business.
Through spying, we have done our share of damage to other governments; but
those who committed espionage against the U.S. government have provided our adversaries
countless volumes of equally damaging information. |
INTERSNARE.com - Unmatched Service and Plans!! Click Below |
GottiFBI's Other Pages |
Mafia: My favorite subject to read about. Here you'll find some links you've seen
before and others you may not have. |
Counterintelligence: Not many people know what CI is, so these areas should broaden your knowledge and
help you understand why we can't fight without it. |
Terrorism: What can I say except that my hatred for people and governments who promote terrorism
is "fanatical". |
The Cold War: One of the most fascintating periods of the 20th century. |
Keepsakes: Books, Videos, Trinkets, Art, Spy Gadgets, Etc. |
You can email me at: agentgotti@aol.com |
Espionage Defined: There are many definitions of espionage, from the very simple to the very complete.
There are also different types of espionage, including economic and industrial.
I define espionage as selling yourself to other governments for
personal or financial gain. The National Counterintelligence Executive defines
it with a little more detail: "The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information
about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the
information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of any foreign nation." For the U.S. Code definition, CLICK HERE |
Espionage is spying. To historians, it's the world's second oldest profession.
To criminologists, it's a crime against government. To practitioners,
its the exercise of tradecraft in the Great Game of governments.
Tradecraft is any technique or trick that substantiates a view of the work as a
skilled occupation or craft. The most common operational skills for espionage
work involve surveillance and running agents. At the barest minimum,
there are only three basic requirements of an espionage operation: (1) a way for the agent to get a hold of someone in case of emergency; (2) a way for the intelligence officer to get information from the agent; and (3) a way to pay the agent. Those who do the actual spying are called agents.
Their supervisors are called officers. GottiFBI Note: Robert Hanssen was an FBI Special Agent who worked for the Russians on and
off for about 15 years. His "handler" or "case officer" was the Russian.
Hanssen was the "agent", "asset", or "source". Spying is not considered a crime against government by the government that employs them, only by the government upon which they're spying. If the spy is a double agent or spies against their own country, then they're guilty of treason or being a traitor. GottiFBI Note: Hanssen, Ames, Howard, and Philby were all Soviet or Russian moles. They either volunteered or were turned on us. Treason is a rather loose word that involves aiding or abetting your country's enemies, and is often tossed around with cases of ideological dissent or protest. Spies are always at risk of becoming traitors. In the U.S., the crime of espionage is covered by Title 18, Chapter 37, Sections 792-799 of the U.S. Code, and includes the following offenses: Harboring or concealing an enemy of the United States Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information Gathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government Photographing or sketching defense installations Using aircraft to photograph defense installations Publication or sale of photographs of defense installations Disclosure of classified information Violation of Intelligence Community regulations Source: O'Connor, T. 2002 |
BLIND DATE -- A meeting between an unknown intelligence officer and an agent, usually of separate
governments, at a place of one or the other's choosing. BLOWBACK -- A deception planted abroad to mislead people in other countries, but then coming back to the originating country through public media channels, intended to deceive one's own government as well. CLOAK AND DAGGER -- The traditional game played by spies and spy agencies, compared to the game of "cops and robbers" played by law enforcement. The word "cloak" means to hide and the term "dagger" means to kill. It technically refers to the art of making somebody disappear without a trace, but has become slang for any kind of traditional spy operation. COUNTERxxxxxx -- 3 basic types: COUNTERespionage, which protects classified materials or agents from being "collected"; COUNTERintelligence, which protects people, organizations, or installations from assassination, infiltration, or sabotage as well as disrupting foreign intelligence gathering; and COUNTERmeasure, a means of countering a specific enemy threat, such as in electronic countermeasures. COVER -- A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to conceal true affiliation or sponsorship. If great care is used to construct a totally false identity, this is called a LEGEND. DEAD DROP -- An exchange of information without the two operatives meeting face to face. Notes and materials, for example, are left in an airport locker or a tree stump. DEFECTOR -- The most common way in which spies are recruited and/or prosecuted for espionage. A defector repudiates his or her country and comes forward to the enemy (walk-in) in possession of information of value. A defector-in-place is one who denounces their country but does not leave. In such cases, the person becomes a "mole", remaining in place where they can funnel information of value. DISINFORMATION -- The creation and dissemination of false information to injure a target. A typical practice would involve forging false documents and leaking copies to the press, for example. Another technique would involve using scientifically produced propaganda to influence citizens under the spell of another power. In times of war, disinformation consists of leaking false war plans and the like. DOUBLE AGENT -- Anyone working for more than one intelligence service, providing information or disinformation about each agency to the other. HONEY TRAP -- A term used to describe the use of sex to blackmail or pressure someone into participating in an intelligence operation, or create a situation in which the target can be blackmailed at a later time. see Raven and Swallow. ILLEGAL -- An agent performing intelligence work in a foreign country who passes him or herself off as not really a citizen of the country they are from; a standard recruitment ploy. Also, a term for anyone under deep cover of a legend. INFORMER -- A person who knowingly or unknowingly provides information or intelligence. MOLE -- A high-level agent who is hidden within an enemy organization who normally only provides information or intelligence in cases where it would be extremely valuable. PRODUCT -- The final result of an intelligence analysis produced for the consumer or user; may be oral, written, or graphic. RATFUCKER -- A term used to describe an infiltrator who has been planted in an organization. RAVEN -- Name for a male agent used to seduce females or other males. SLEEPER -- A technique used (extensively by the Germans and Russians) by intelligence services to plant an immigrant into a foreign country, and then activate him or her at a later time when needed. SUCKING DRY -- A term (originally Russian in origin) to describe the process of debriefing an agent after he or she comes home from a mission. SWALLOW -- Name for a female agent used to seduce men or other females. TURN -- Turning somebody is to transform an agent into a double agent. The most common methods are: threat of execution; and blackmail, often involving sex. Sometimes, patriotism and money are used. WET WORK -- A term used to describe intelligence operations involving murder or assassination. |
Tradecraft Glossary of Terms |
YAHOO News: Get the latest on all the spy news |
Women Spies: This ain't just about men!! |
GottiFBI's Selected Spy Cases: Nice Selection |
HOMEPAGE: Go Back to Front Page |
Characteristics of Spies (Source: PERSEREC) Reasonably complete information is available on the significant demographic variables for most of the 150 espionage offenders. Some of the older or more obscure cases are not well reported in open sources. Demographic characteristics of the publicly known espionage offenders are as follows. The number of cases for which information is available on each variable is shown at the end of each entry. Gender: 93% males, 7% females. Information is available for all 150 cases. Age when Espionage Began: 6% were under 20; 40% were 20 to 29; 27% were 30 to 39; and 27% were 40 or over. There is a significant difference in ages between civilian and military spies. For the civilians, 44% were age 40 or over at the time they began their espionage. For the military, 57% were 20 to 29 years old when they started. Information is available for 147 cases. Marital Status when Espionage Began: 57% married, 33% single, 10% separated or divorced. Information is available for 141 cases. Race or Ethnicity: 84% white, 6% black, 5% Hispanic, and 5% other. Information is available for 141 cases. Sexual Preference: 95% heterosexual, 5% homosexual. Information is available for 116 cases. Citizenship: 83% born in U.S., 17% naturalized. Most (77%) of the naturalized citizens who became spies were civilians rather than military personnel. Twenty-six percent of all the civilian spies were naturalized citizens as compared with 8% of the military spies. Information is available for 148 cases. Education: 7% had less than high school; 39% were high school graduates; 20% had some college; 20% were college graduates; 14% had at least some work toward their Masters or PhD. Information is available for 133 cases. Type of Employment when Espionage Began: 49% uniformed military, 18% government civilian, 24% government contractor, and 9% had already left government service or their job was unrelated to their spying. Information is available for 148 cases. Rank of Uniformed Military: 19% were E1 to E3; 51% were E4 to E6; 19% were E7 to WO; and 11% Officer. Information is available for 67 cases. Characteristics of the Espionage Activity The following information about the espionage activity is known from open sources. Data on a number of significant variables are available for most of the cases. Recruitment: Sixty-four percent of the spies took the initiative in volunteering their services to a foreign intelligence service. Fifteen percent were recruited by a friend or family member, most of whom had themselves volunteered, while only 22% were recruited on the initiative of a foreign intelligence service. These percentages differ for different groups. For example, 71% of all military offenders were volunteers, versus 57% for civilians. Seven of the 12 women spies were recruited by a spouse or boyfriend. Information is available for 148 cases. Motivation: Information on motivation is broken down by categories commonly used when describing espionage offenders, although it is always difficult to know what was really going on in a persons head. One individual may have more than one motivation, so the following percentages do not add up to 100%. Money (either need or greed) was a motivating factor in 69% of the cases, and it was apparently the sole motive in 56%. Disgruntlement or revenge toward employer or some other person or situation was a motive in 27%, and ideology a motive in 22%. Ideology includes beliefs and sympathies resulting from cultural affinity (common ethnic or national background). A desire to please a friend or family member was a motivating factor in 17% of cases, many of them cases in which the spy was recruited by the friend or family member. Twelve percent were attracted by what they perceived as the thrills or excitement of becoming a spy, while 4% were drawn by a compelling need to be recognized and feel important. Only 5% were coerced. Thrills or excitement and need for recognition were, in most cases, supporting rather than primary motivations. Information is available for all 150 cases. Unsuccessful Spies: Thirty-nine offenders (26% of all those who attempted to commit espionage) were unsuccessful. They were arrested before they succeeded in passing classified information to a foreign country. Of the 39 would-be spies who were caught before they could do any damage, 69% were military personnel, mainly young, unmarried, enlisted personnel with no more than a high school education. All were native-born American citizens motivated mainly by the simple idea that selling secrets would be an easy way to get some money. Interestingly, over 60% of the military personnel in this category were in the Navy. Length of Espionage: Of the 111 spies who succeeded in passing information to a foreign country, 27% were caught in less than one year. Forty-four percent lasted more than one year but less than five, while 29% remained undetected for five years or more. Security Clearance when Espionage Began: Fifteen percent of the spies held a Top Secret SCI clearance at the time they began committing espionage. Top Secret clearances were held by 35%, Secret by 21%, and Confidential by 3%. Twenty-six percent held no clearance at all. Those with no clearance include accomplices, witting spouses, those who provided classified information obtained during a previous job when they did have a clearance, and those who provided sensitive but unclassified information. Information is available for 141 cases. Where Espionage Began: Sixty-six percent of espionage cases began in the United States, with a large majority of those on the East Coast. Of the 34% that began outside the United States, 66% began in Western Europe (mainly West Germany) and 20% in Asia or Southeast Asia. Information is available for 146 cases. Country Receiving Information: During the Cold War, most espionage was conducted by the Soviet Union and associated Communist countries in Eastern Europe. The surprising thing is how many other neutral or allied countries have also been involved in espionage against the United States. American citizens have been arrested for conducting espionage on behalf of South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Israel, Netherlands, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Ghana, Liberia, South Africa, El Salvador and Ecuador. Information is based on the 111 cases in which offenders succeeded in passing information. Espionage Target: Information from the following organizations was compromised, or, in the case of unsuccessful espionage attempts, was intended to be compromised. The number after each organization is the number of offenders who targeted that organization. Navy, 38; Army, 32; Air Force, 22; CIA, 16; Defense contractors, 15; NSA, 7; State, 7; FBI, 4; Marines, 4; DoD civilians, 4; DIA, 2; INS, 1. Six offenders compromised materials from more than one agency and are, therefore counted twice. Information is available for 146 cases. Payment Received: Although money tops the list of motivations for espionage, it is interesting to see how few spies received significant payments. Most foreign intelligence services are mistrustful of volunteers and are tight with their money, except in the most important cases. Most spies received relatively little, despite the high risk of getting caught and the monumental cost of espionage to the nation. Of the 111 cases in which spies succeeded in passing information to a foreign intelligence service, information on payments is available for 92 cases. Sixty-four of those receive some monetary payment, while 28 are believed to have received no monetary payments. Offenders who received no monetary payment include those who provided information after defecting to the other side, women who helped their husband or boyfriend, some who appeared to have been motivated only by a desire to help the other country, and others who sought some non-monetary quid pro quo such as help for a local business, post-retirement employment in the country that received the information, or release of a spouse from prison. Of the 64 spies known to have received cash payments, 11% received less than $1,000; 17% received $1,000 to $9,999; 26% received $10,000 to $99,999; 12% received $100,000 to $999,999; while 4% received $1,000,000 or more. It is noteworthy that some of these payments were made as long as 50 years ago, and that the payment figures have not been adjusted for changes in the value of the dollar over the years. They also represent only the amount that the spy is known to have received. After their arrest, spies often try to minimize the amount of money they received in an effort to minimize their crime. Length of Sentence: The percentages for each initial sentence length are as follows:18% less than 5 years; 20% 5 to 9.9 years; 18% 10 to 19.9 years; 10% 20 to 29.9 years; 7% 30 to 30.9 years; 2% 40 years; 12% life in prison. Sentencing information is available for 127 cases. Twenty cases are known to have had other outcomes such as defection, suicide, or immunity from prosecution. Date Arrested or Exposed: Five spies were arrested or otherwise publicly exposed during the decade of the 1950s. This increased to 13 in the 1960s and 13 in the 1970s. Arrests and other public exposures mushroomed to 56 in the 1980s and remained at a high level, with 29, in the 1990s. Information is available for all 150 cases. Large variations in the number of arrests from one time period to another may be determined more by the nature of the counterintelligence sources and tools that are available during a given period than by changes in the prevalence of espionage. The 1980s have been called the Decade of the Spy because of the number of successful spies exposed during that period. However, it was also the decade of the unsuccessful spy. Many young, unmarried military enlisted personnel were caught before they succeeded in selling any secrets. Of the high number of cases in the 1990s, many were successful spies exposed by sources that became available after the end of the Cold War. |
Why Spy? - Uses/Misuses of Intelligence |
An American Hero: Col Don Nichols - USAF |
Short Wave Radio Espionage: Very Interesting |
NSA Employee Security Manual: Knowing that it has been made public, I'm sure this has changed. But this is a nice find!! |
Ana Belen Montes - Latest Senior Spy: The usual indicators of unexplained affluence, financial problems, or other criminal
behavior, were just not visible in Ana Montes' profile. She seemed every
bit the loyal and dedicated DIA analyst. In fact, she was one of the
best; the senior Cuban analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency. What
nobody knew was that she had been spying for Cuba for a number of years; 16 to
be exact. She didn't want money or any other tangible gifts. She did
it for moral and ideological reasons. Montes was arrested in Sept. 2001
and had been under surveillance for more than a year. She came under suspicion
after counterspies detected "anomalies" in intelligence reports from overseas
indicating U.S. intelligence information had been leaking out. According
to the Washington Times, Montes provided Cuban intelligence detailed information
on U.S. military secrets. "It would appear that because of her position, she could tell the Cuban government
what we know about their military, what we knew about their positions, and perhaps
even more important, what we didn't know, whatever the gaps might be." According to Cuban press reports, the Cuban government admitted it had a relationship
with Montes, which began in 1985. Foreign Minister Felipe Perez
Roque said Montes had ties with Havana "compelled by ethics and an admirable sense of justice." She was accused of jeopardizing Top Secret information, revealing the
identity of four US agents operating on Cuba, as well as details of US naval
maneuvers off the island. "I felt deep respect and admiration for Ana Belen Montes. She has already spoken
for herself about her relationship with Cuba and her motivations." Montes, 45, cooperated with federal authorities, and will continue to cooperate.
She was sentenced to 25 years in prison, with the possibility of having
five knocked off for good behavior. A condition of her eventual release is that
she is prohibited from using credit cards or the Internet, just like life in Cuba.
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For more on Ana Montes, CLICK HERE. You'll find a plethora of detailed reporting on one of the most significant spy cases
in recent memory. Surely, there will be books about her. |
ESPIONAGE: As set forth in 18 U.S.C. 792-798, in general: a. Espionage is the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent or reason to believe that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. The offense of espionage applies in time of war or peace. b. The statute makes it an offense to gather, with the requisite intent or belief, national defense information, by going upon, entering, flying over, or obtaining access by any means to any installation or place used by the United States in connection with national defense. The method of gathering information is immaterial. c. Anyone who lawfully or unlawfully is entrusted with or otherwise has possession of, access to, or control over information about national defense that he or she has reason to believe could be used against the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, and willfully communicates or transmits, or attempts to communicate or transmit, such information to any person not entitled to receive it, is guilty of espionage. d. Anyone entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of information pertaining to the national defense, who through gross negligence permits the same to be lost, stolen, abstracted, destroyed, removed from its proper place of custody, or delivered to anyone in violation of this trust, is guilty of espionage. e. If two or more persons conspire to commit and one of them commits an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy, all members of the conspiracy may be punished for violation of the Espionage Act. |
Special Report from US News and World Report - A great compilation! - But ya gotta pay |
International Spy Museum: If you are in D.C., this place is a must for any fan of espionage |
COMINT: What is it and how is it done? A++ |
Camp-X: Canada's Intelligence History - Neat! |
Eye Spy Magazine: Great current info - A++ |